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1 
The Management of First party fraud in e-
tailing: A qualitative study 
Abstract 
Purpose – First party fraud in which retail consumers commit fraud against retailers is 
a growing problem. However, to date studies on retail crime have focused almost 
entirely on fraudulent consumer behaviours in physical stores. With the growth of e-
commerce, the losses from this fraud is growing so there is strong need to research this 
problem from multiple perspectives. 
Methodology – We conducted three case studies and a total of 24 semi-structured 
interviews with retail managers and evaluated their existing prevention-related 
documentation. Fraud management lifecycle theory was used to organise and discuss 
the findings. 
Finding – We found that many retailers are treating this problem as just a cost of doing 
business online and have no detailed plans for dealing with this problem or any 
reporting to law enforcement agencies. However, they have begun working with 
delivery companies for delivery accuracy. Use of convenience stores as collection 
points is also showing early improvements. 
Limitations – The small number of cases and interviews used is a limitation of this 
study. However, we believe that the findings are useful for advancing knowledge in this 
emerging research area. 
Practical Implications - This study provides insight into existing management practices 
in this domain, and makes recommendations on how to improve the management of 
first party fraud. The study also makes a case for increased managerial interest and 
involvement in reducing first party fraud. The study also helps bridge a glaring gap in 
existing literature and provides useful leads for further research. 
Originality/value – To our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate the existing 
practices employed to manage first party fraud in e-retail. 
Keywords – First Party Fraud, Retail Fraud, Consumer Fraud, Online Consumer 
Fraud, Consumer Misbehaviour, Retail Crime Prevention 
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Introduction 
Advances in Information Technology have made e-commerce possible by eliminating 
the time and space limitations of traditional brick and mortar retailing. Whilst e-
commerce provides many advantages over brick and mortar retailing, i.e. access to a 
global audience and convenience of shopping anytime and anywhere, it has generated 
new challenges/risks associated with information security, online frauds etc.  
First party fraud, in which retail consumers engage in various dishonest acts in an e-
commerce environment with the aim of gaining an advantage in the exchange is a 
growing challenge for online retailers, here referred to as e-tailers (BRC, 2013; Retail 
Fraud, 2013).  
The most common forms of first party fraud in the retail industry are: deshopping, 
chargeback, bust out fraud, and misrepresentation of details (Amasiatu and Shah, 2014, 
2015). Deshopping occurs when consumers purchase products with the intention to 
return them after use; chargeback fraud occurs when consumers deny receiving 
delivered goods or return different goods to those dispatched; bust out fraud occurs 
when consumers apply for and use retail credit facilities with the aim of not fulfilling 
their credit agreement e.g. when relocating abroad; misrepresentation of details occurs 
when consumers dishonestly misrepresent financial or personal details in order to get 
access to credit facilities they would otherwise not be entitled to.  
A review of existing literature provides evidence to suggest that first party fraud is 
widespread and has profound impact on retail profitability (Amasiatu and Shah, 2014; 
Hinsz, 2016). For example, the British Retail Consortium estimates the cost of first 
party fraud in the region of £74 million or 32% of fraud costs (BRC, 2015), while an 
independent survey estimated the cost to be £405 million (Retail Fraud, 2013).  
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Despite the prevalence of first party fraud, to date studies on retail crime have focused 
almost entirely on fraudulent consumer behaviours within brick-and-mortar/physical 
stores. With the growth of e-commerce and the move towards online retailing, it is 
important for research in this area to continue into e-retail. 
This paper is therefore aimed at bridging the gap in knowledge in this area, in response 
to calls for increased research in the area of fraudulent consumer behaviour in e-tailing 
(Amasiatu and Shah, 2014; Harris, 2010; King and Dennis, 2003). 
This study also tried to explore the various practices adopted by retailers to manage first 
party fraud. To achieve these objectives, we conducted a total of 24 interviews with 
retail staff involved in the management of first party fraud across three retail 
organisations. In addition, we conducted a comprehensive literature search on fraud 
management practices with the use of various electronic databases. Guided by 
literature, the focus was on a holistic approach to fraud management rather than on a 
single fraud management activity. 
Researchers such as Amasiatu and Shah (2018), Durbin (2007), Wilhelm (2004) 
suggest that adopting a holistic approach to fraud management can lead to superior 
fraud loss performance. These recommendations necessitated the need for a holistic 
fraud management framework to guide the data collection process. The fraud 
management framework by Wilhelm (2004) was used to evaluate the existing 
management approaches employed to deal with first party fraud. 
A brief background to provide a context for this research is first presented. Next a 
summary of the research framework adopted is presented before the research approach 
and findings are discussed. 
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Background 
First party fraud has been noted as one of the most significant challenges to online 
retailers, due to its prevalence and regularity (BRC, 2013; Retail Fraud, 2013: Hinsz, 
2016).  
Extant literature mentions various reasons for the prevalence of first party fraud. For 
example, King and Dennis (2003), Reynolds and Harris (2005), and King et al. (2007) 
provide several accounts to show that organisational policies (such as lenient no-
questions asked returns policies) and limited action and/or inaction by retailers 
reinforce fraudulent behaviour. Furthermore, first party fraud is easy to commit and 
often requires little or no sophistication. 
Liberal returns policies are perceived as an essential part of customer service and used 
as a competitive weapon in today’s retail environment. In e-commerce, returns policies 
are considered even more imperative due to the lack of physical interaction with a 
product (Foscht et al. 2013). Returning products allow customers to reverse the 
purchase decision and provide competitive advantage to a retailer. 
Prior research has shown that whilst a lenient returns policy can create a competitive 
advantage for a retailer, it can also expose a retailer to abuse (Peterson and Kumar, 
2009). For example, deshopping fraud where consumers order and return items after 
they have been worn/used has been largely facilitated by e-commerce (Schmidt et al., 
1999; Piron and Young, 2000; King and Dennis, 2006).  
Furthermore, when goods are ordered and move through the supply chain, there are 
many opportunities for things to go wrong, i.e. theft/loss of parcel, damage in handling, 
delivery to the wrong address, etc. which increases the opportunities for abuse. 
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Therefore, the opportunities available to misbehave and the convenience provided by 
online shopping combine to make misbehaviour more attractive online.  
Despite the prevalence of this behaviour, extant literature suggests that retailers do not 
appropriately deal with this fraud committed by their own customers for various reasons 
such as poor understanding of first party fraud, fear of negative impact on customer 
experience, etc. (Amasiatu and Shah, 2018; Fullerton and Punj, 2004; King et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, tackling business crime is not always high priority for law enforcement 
agencies and the general public have a more positive attitude towards this fraud 
compared to other frauds (Wilkes, 1978; Dodge et al., 1996; King and Levi, 2003), 
which means that there is very little deterrent effect for potential offenders and 
reoffenders. With the growth of e-commerce and prevalence of this fraud, assuming 
first party fraud to be a cost of doing business is not a sound strategy, hence any applied 
research such as this one could be very useful for retailers. 
Research framework 
For effective fraud management, a coherent strategy is preferred rather than a focus on 
isolated fraud management activities (Bishop, 2004; Button and Brooks, 2009; Durbin, 
2007; Wilhelm, 2004). We reviewed literature with an aim to find a framework that is 
either used in first party fraud or similar context, so that that the framework can be used 
to evaluate the existing management approaches adopted by the retailers in this study. 
There are a number of fraud frameworks in the literature such as Furlan and Bajec’s 
framework that was developed for insurance fraud, Wilhelm’s fraud management 
lifecycle theory, Government Accountability Office (GAO) framework for disaster 
assistance programs, the anti-ID fraud framework and the identity fraud enterprise 
management framework. These frameworks contain essential elements or components 
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for successful fraud management. Even though these frameworks bear many 
similarities, the fraud management lifecycle theory was chosen for this study mainly 
due to its flexibility and compatibility with the retail industry and nature of fraud 
studied. Besides, it has been empirically tested in a number of industries, designed with 
the private sector in mind although flexible enough to be adapted to other sectors and 
has received favourable reviews and citations in a number of research papers. 
Nevertheless, the framework elements represent in the authors’ views appropriate 
components for successful fraud management. The other frameworks were either too 
complex or too simple to be used for this study.  
The fraud management lifecycle theory (Wilhelm, 2004) underpins this research so we 
present a brief description of it here. Wilhelm (2004) proposed the Fraud Management 
Lifecycle Theory consisting of eight components that drive success or failure in fraud 
management: Deterrence, Prevention, Detection, Mitigation, Analysis, Policy, 
Investigation and Prosecution (See figure 1 below). Wilhelm (2004) argues that the aim 
of the framework is not to present a series of sequential operations or elements, but to 
present the essential activities necessary for fraud management. Wilhelm (2004) 
subsequently applied and tested his framework in four different industries and claimed 
that all eight activities were present and vital for successful fraud management. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Linear Representation of the Fraud Management Lifecycle Theory 
(Source: Wilhelm, 2004) 
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Different elements of this framework are briefly explained next: Deterrence defined by 
Wilhelm, (2004, p. 10) as “activities designed through fear of consequences or 
difficulty of penetration, to turn aside, discourage, or prevent fraudulent activity from 
being attempted” (Wilhelm, 2004, p. 10). In this sense, activities designed to 
communicate the consequences or disincentives of misbehaviour have an effect on 
discouraging offenders or would-be offenders from misbehaviour. Applying prevention 
in the context of fraud, researchers have suggested that a number of activities are 
essential at this stage, such as knowing the size of the problem, internal and external 
collaboration, senior management or executive level involvement, training and 
screening of employees and fraud-proofing new policies. Detection is intended to reveal 
or detect fraudulent activity, often through the use of statistical techniques and 
algorithms. Mitigation activities are those activities that are intended to stop fraud and 
prevent further losses following detection. Analysis is concerned with carrying out a 
thorough analysis and understanding of successful frauds in order to determine the 
underlying cause of their success. Policy activities are those activities or actions 
undertaken to evaluate, or develop policies to mitigate fraud risks. Investigation is 
concerned with searching, collecting, and retaining evidence that will enable offender 
sanctioning, prosecution or redress. Prosecution activities are concerned with putting 
forward a case that will lead to offender punishment. The research approach and 
findings are discussed next. 
Detect Analyse Policy Investigate Prosecute Mitigate Deter Prevent 
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Research Approach 
We adopted a qualitative case study approach as our research objectives were mainly 
about understanding how retailers are managing the problem of first party fraud. Focus 
was on getting a detailed insight rather than surveying an entire industry so our choice 
of research method was made with the nature of research objectives in mind, which 
were:  
 To understand how retailers were managing first party fraud 
 To provide recommendations based on the findings from three case studies and 
literature review 
Using the case study approach, this study investigated the approaches or methods in 
three selected companies. As these companies are some of the largest and most 
successful retailers (in terms of sales and revenue) in the UK, it was expected that there 
would be plans in place for managing first party fraud. The fraud management lifecycle 
theory (Wilhelm, 2004) was used to organise, discuss and assess the approaches used 
within the companies.  
In order to understand how retailers managed first party fraud an appropriate 
interpretive research approach is needed. The case studies conducted as part of this 
study looked specifically at existing management practices employed by the retailers to 
manage first party fraud. One of the objectives of the study was to compare different 
cases in order to understand how retailers were managing this fraud.  
We adopted a systematic approach to this study. Firstly, interview questions were 
formulated around the elements of the framework based on findings from the literature 
review. A pilot study was then conducted on 8 postgraduate students following the steps 
mentioned by Wengraf (2001). Participants were chosen based on their experience or 
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knowledge of first party fraud, and asked to look out for a number of things like 
repeated questions, clarity of questions among others. Comments and feedbacks were 
subsequently taken into consideration when revising the final interview questions. 
Once the interview questions were deemed ready for use, semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with three retailers. To identify the case organisations, about 20 
retailers were invited to be part of the study by mail, 3 of which indicated interest in the 
study. Semi-structured interviews were used as the data collection method. Interviews 
are one of the most important sources of case study information (Yin, 1994; Yin, 2014). 
The selection of interviewees for the study was purposive, mainly from individuals 
involved in managing, detecting or preventing first party fraud. This approach has been 
adopted in many other similar studies (for example, Brooks et. al., 2009; Bussmann and 
Werle, 2006). For convenience and to limit travel time for the researcher, three of the 
interviews were conducted over the phone. A total of 24 interviews were conducted 
across all three retailers: 13 interviews in the first company, 7 in the second and 4 in 
the third company. The number of interviews in each case was according to the 
availability of relevant individuals for the interview. Participating in the study was 
entirely voluntary and consent was sought with each respondent in advance in line with 
research ethics. Each interview took between 45 and 90 minutes. All interviews were 
recorded using digital voice recorder and later transcribed, and a manual approach of 
coding and analysing the data based on themes from the fraud management framework 
was adopted. 
Description of case organisations 
This section presents a summary of each of the three cases studied and the respondents 
in each of the companies (see table I below). In keeping with the confidentiality 
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agreement, the identities of the companies and respondents have been taken out and are 
henceforth referred to as Company 1, Company 2, and Company 3.  
Table I.  Description of respondents at Company 1, 2 and 3 
Company 1  
Company 1 is a leading multi-brand digital retailer in the UK and Ireland, selling 100s 
of big name brands as well as its own brand of retail goods. Following the growth of e-
commerce, the company repositioned itself as a digital retailer with over 80% of its 
sales now carried out online.   
It is a company that thrives on new ideas with the ambition to reach more people and 
make their brands accessible. With such ambitious goals, company 1 placed a strong 
emphasis on increasing sales and customer satisfaction. The study identified issues 
concerning the organisational goals that impacted first party fraud management, e.g. a 
focus on sales that was incongruent with appropriate sanctioning of offenders.  
Company 2 
Company 2 is one of the top supermarket chains in the UK by size, with 100s of stores 
in the UK. Having built up its store presence well before venturing into online retailing, 
the company has implemented a range of strategies to deal with store crime. However, 
following its transition to digital (e-commerce) retailing, new opportunities for 
customer abuse arose. The company attributes both third party stolen card fraud and 
fraudulent first party (customer) claims as their biggest online fraud losses. 
Like Company 1, Company 2 placed a strong emphasis on customer service that again 
seemed to be detrimental to its first party fraud management capability, mainly its very 
generous returns policy which allows return of online orders up to 12 months after 
purchase which most respondents perceived to be encouraging deshopping.  
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Company 3 
Company 3 is one of the top 5 supermarket chains in the UK by size, with well over 
400 stores in the UK. The company has a robust e-commerce platform, and is one of 
the fastest growing online fashion retailers in the UK.  
Company 3 has a well-established store presence all over the UK with a range of 
strategies to deal with store crime. However, new opportunities for customer abuse have 
arisen following the growth of e-commerce. The strength of the company’s fraud 
initiative was that there was a fraud strategy within the business, however first party 
fraud was largely not considered a serious threat to profitability and so is a small line 
item in the budget when compared to other crimes.  
Results and Discussion 
A summary of frauds faced by the participating companies is given in table II. 
Deshopping refers to the return of items (for a refund) after they have been worn. 
Refund fraud occurred when customers denied receiving all or some of the items 
delivered to them. Misuse of facility fraud occurred when customers fraudulently 
misused credit facilities with the intention that payment will not be made or made in 
full. Chargeback fraud occurred when customers deliberately denied making orders, 
while Coupon fraud occurred when customers knowingly reused one-off 
vouchers/coupons as a result of system error/fault. 
Table II.  Comparison of first party fraud types across the three retailers (Y= present, N=absent) 
Deterrence 
Deterrence is considered an essential first step in the management of fraud (NHS 
CFSMS, 2009; Wilhelm, 2004). The aim of deterrence is to deter people from engaging 
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in fraud through fear of consequences. This includes raising awareness of the costs and 
consequences of fraud (Wilhelm, 2004).  
Amongst the companies interviewed, the focus was mainly to manage fraudulent 
behaviour once they arose rather than deterring them pro-actively. None of the retailers 
pursued any educational/consumer awareness activity to highlight the costs and 
consequences of engaging in first party fraud. Rather, deterrence resulted from the 
deterrent contributions provided by the other framework/fraud management activities, 
as illustrated below: 
When you challenge them, some of them will stop claiming for a 
while…(Company 1) 
 Following our investigation, we can then challenge the customer and say 
we have information that shows that you are lying, and that usually scares 
them off or stops any further contact (Company 2) 
Well, if they do it once, we will allow it but if it carries on we know there is a 
pattern and we take it seriously…we can deny them the claim and that stops 
some of them from continuing (Company 3) 
 
Retailers believed that customer education and awareness were vital; however, this was 
not pursued in any of the participating companies. One of the participating retailers 
suggested that it was not cost effective to engage in any awareness program at least at 
that moment. 
Are we looking to undertake deterrence? No. Because we don’t lose much 
from these frauds… In the bigger scale of things it’s not a lot, I mean not in 
millions yet (Company 2) 
Researchers such as King and Dennis (2003), King et al. (2007) and Rosenbaum et al. 
(2011) highlight the importance of education as a means of changing the motivation of 
offenders. The findings of the current study whilst reinforcing the extant ones also show 
that despite the time interval between the reported studies and this current one, retailers 
are still not pursuing any form of education or consumer awareness as a vital component 
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of their first party fraud strategy. Therefore, it can be implied from the information that 
deterrence as a strategy does not feature prominently in the actions undertaken by these 
retailers in tackling first party fraud. 
Prevention 
One of the most common prevention activities referred to in the interviews was staff 
training. Training employees to be aware of first party fraud red flags is an important 
step in improving fraud prevention performance. Warehouse staff and call centre staff 
most often were involved in the management of first party fraud, i.e. detecting 
deshopping (by properly inspecting returned items) and/or fraudulent claims by 
customers. However, these jobs were often seen as low-level jobs that attracted little 
training. The retailers interviewed provided mostly on-the-job training on first party 
fraud red flags to staff in relevant positions, however responses varied across retailers. 
Whilst two of the retailers agreed the training provided could be improved, they 
believed that the training provided was nonetheless helping to reduce their fraud losses. 
On the other hand, one of the retailers was less confident in the level of training 
provided to employees in these areas, which limited prevention capability. Knowledge 
limitations are likely to limit the detection of fraud.   
We have examples where customers will order like Microsoft Xbox reward 
points and have very sophisticatedly opened the cellophane wrapping on the 
product to get the reward points…and then repackage it back, a sophisticated 
level of repackaging where it is quite hard to the untrained eye to spot that 
the packaging has actually been tampered with and has been opened and 
used…We have trained our warehouse returns staff to the point where they 
can tell when the product is returned that it has been tampered with 
(Company 1) 
They are so many models of iPad, and if you have got someone in the 
warehouse that has never had an iPad before and someone’s ordered the 
latest iPad and returned the old iPad in that box and it looks brand new, and 
they put a seal on it to make it look like the original one, it is very easy to 
get away with it…All we do is scan the barcodes of the returned item and 
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check if it is the original item, but some of these customers take the barcodes 
off of the original model and stick it on the back of their old one, and the 
guy at the warehouse will scan it and if looks like the original one they just 
presume it is the item (Company 2) 
Formal fraud awareness training was however provided to other more senior 
management staff, for instance: 
There is a workshop that other retailers attend that I attend every couple of 
months also to discuss current trends, current patterns that people have seen, 
give other people tips and things like that (Company 2) 
The training I have done through the company is a year course in your own 
time and in the evening and at the end of it you get a qualification in criminal 
law, so that from the law side is the qualification that I have got, and I have 
also got a lot of management qualifications (Company 1) 
Although senior managers may know how to react to fraud, this is of little benefit if 
more junior employees (who are tasked with detecting first party fraud) are unable to 
identify it in the first place because of lack of or inadequate training or understanding. 
Internal and external collaboration is also essential in preventing fraud - the more 
comprehensive the information a retailer can gather about an individual, the easier it is 
to know when the customer is lying (FSA, 2006; NHS CFSMS, 2009; Wilhelm, 2004). 
All three retailers believed external collaboration was important in tackling first party 
fraud, however we found this to be minimal. 
We currently share information with other retailers, like modus operandi via 
emails or phone calls. We do this bi-weekly. We do not share the details of 
the customers though (Company 2) 
We discuss specific jobs…say have you had an issue at this particular 
address or area or just in general, general chat about what fraud actions they 
take and what we do (Company 1) 
We currently share information with a few retailers like problems with 
particular addresses but we are currently working with other retailers to have 
a robust data sharing agreement in place to strengthen our defence 
(Company 3) 
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One obstacle to effective external collaboration that emerged was that these retailers 
sometimes saw fraud prevention as offering a competitive advantage, therefore 
information sharing could jeopardise this edge. During the interviews, some of the 
retailers spoke of how their superior preventative measures pushed fraud to other 
retailers. If competitive interests could be put aside, more comprehensive information 
sharing and collaboration could provide tactical advantage to retailers by providing 
information about offenders that can help reduce fraud. 
Pre-employment screening of employees and/or contractors is also an important 
preventative strategy (Brooks et al. 2009; Button and Brooks, 2009). The retailers 
interviewed mostly regarded the job of drivers and warehouse staff as low-level jobs 
that required very little or no pre-employment checks, even though these employees 
occupy trusted positions that could expose retailers to abuse. Consumers can take 
advantage of a retailer’s weakness such as staff theft to make fraudulent claims, and so 
recruiting honest staff is crucial in reducing opportunities for first party fraud, as 
demonstrated by this respondent.  
We have customers now claiming to have received empty boxes on high 
value items such as iPads and electronic items. This is because we used to 
have situations where empty boxes were delivered to customers, usually on 
low value shoes due to thefts at our depots, but never on high value items. 
Some customers saw the glitch in our system, and now started claiming on 
high value items like iPads (Company 1) 
Reference checks were mostly sought and little else, and even sometimes these checks 
were not sought. For company 2, reference checks and/or background checks were 
sought for staff in these areas while company 1 carried out only reference checks. Only 
company 3 claimed to carry out background checks on all employees. However, 
respondents suggested that these checks were not always carried out.  
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We are meant to carry out these checks, but we have so many colleagues 
and some get through without checks (Company 2) 
These drivers don’t get CRB checked because it costs too much, the business 
doesn’t consider it and it’s wrong (Company 1) 
More worrying is the fact that screening for agency staff was left to be the responsibility 
of the agency/agencies.  
We don’t know if they do any checks on the drivers, we sign the contract 
and we expect them to adhere to it (Company 2) 
The security checks carried out on these drivers could definitely be a lot 
better. Sometimes on the run up to peak times, sometimes their backs are 
against the wall really, they have got to find all these drivers to get all these 
parcels out to the customer. So, I think during those peak times that the 
checks are not as thorough (Company 1) 
Finally, the retailers interviewed employed the use of technology as well as working 
with delivery companies to improve delivery accuracy in order to prevent fraudulent 
customer claims. Some of the solutions employed include monitoring customer claims 
and returns using database, automated transaction risk scoring to flag up orders for 
manual review, delivery van tracking and end-to-end tracking of parcels, CCTV in 
depots and warehouses (to stop theft and reduce opportunities for fraudulent customer 
claims, use of collection stores as collection points, and weighing high value items prior 
to dispatch to reduce the opportunity for fraudulent empty box claims.  
Detection 
For the purpose of this study, detection activities are those intended to identify fraud 
during and subsequent to the completion of the fraudulent activity. Early detection and 
mitigation helps reduce the impact of fraud on a company (NHS CFSMS, 2009; 
Wilhelm, 2004).  
In the wider fraud arena, detection is often done using automated statistical techniques 
and algorithms, however we found that the detection of first party fraud was not 
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completely automated and sometimes involved manual detection methods. This meant 
that detection and mitigation activities were often performed within the same function 
and team. These activities are further reported in the next stage of the fraud framework.  
All retailers emphasised the importance of training front-line staff in detecting first 
party fraud. For example, respondents claimed that deshopping was managed in this 
way by having warehouse staff inspect returned items visually and sometimes through 
smell.  
Respondents also claimed that credit applications were credit-scored to minimise 
losses, and that those applications not meeting set thresholds were either automatically 
rejected or flagged up for manual review.  
The way the retailers’ detected fraudulent first party claims varied considerably. 
Company 1 had a dedicated and specialist first party fraud team within their customer 
care team that detected and mitigated first party fraud claims, while other fraud cases 
were handled by their more generalist fraud team. On the other hand, the more 
generalist fraud teams in Companies 2 & 3 were tasked with the detection and 
mitigation of all fraud cases including first party fraud claims. However, we found that 
identity fraud and internal staff fraud investigations were often the priority for these 
more generalist fraud teams.  
When first party fraud was suspected in some cases, without substantial evidence of the 
behaviour customers may deny their behaviour leaving the retailer in a vulnerable 
position. For instance: 
I had this customer that had bought a coat from us and returned it after some 
days, and it was clearly worn. When we checked the pocket, we found Tesco 
receipt in the coat with the buckle broken, so we returned it back to the 
customer, but the customer contacted us and then claimed the buckle was 
faulty when it was delivered. In the end, we had to refund her (Company 1) 
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If we haven’t got enough evidence we set them up; if we know someone is 
not good we will try and keep it to ourselves and let them carry on doing it 
and we catch them out (Company 2) 
We are now technologically in a place where we can prove to a customer 
that we have delivered the parcel or to at least have enough proof to 
challenge the customer if they are claiming the parcel has not been received. 
We believe that we have stopped the level of exploitation that we were 
having because if you have no signature and you have no GPS codes and 
you have little information available, it is hard to challenge a customer if 
they are claiming that the goods have not been received. So what we were 
finding was that we were in a position where we inevitably had to credit the 
customer and give the customer the benefit of the doubt (Company 1) 
There are lots of times when parcels get lost in transit and we do redeliver 
or refund the customer if we can’t prove that it was delivered but that’s why 
we use DPD for those higher ticket items because the risks are a lot higher 
with the higher items (Company 2) 
Mitigation 
Mitigation activities begin once a reasonable suspicion of fraudulent activity is 
detected. Mitigation focuses on actions that are intended to reduce the extent of fraud 
losses and to stop fraudulent activity from continuing (Wilhelm, 2004).  
Retailers mitigated losses from deshopping by training warehouse staff to detect and 
reject worn, used or wrong returns. However, the extent to which they pursued this 
strategy differed between retailers, with some retailers adopting a more lenient position 
compared to others. Some of the respondents in company 2 blamed their very lenient 
returns policy, which in their opinion was encouraging deshopping. These respondents 
further suggested that they sold off a lot of the returned stock (which could have been 
detected and mitigated) to other retailers to re-coup some of their losses: 
Last year, we used to job off around £8000 worth of stock a week…Yes, so 
we are recuperating a lot of that back from selling it on so that is where we 
mitigate the losses in terms of getting it back because we can’t put them 
back to stock (Company 2) 
19 
With regards to fraudulent refund claims, retailers often relied on the offender’s prior 
history as a predictor of future behaviour. The retailers who referenced an individual’s 
prior history had robust systems for collating information on past behaviour. 
Information gained from an individual’s prior history was used to determine future 
behaviour. Respondents assert that there is a strong relationship between an offender’s 
profile and a combination of their past behaviour and attitude. 
I had this customer who was claiming one of the items in her parcel was 
missing - a camera worth £579 which was in a parcel with another item of 
£48. She had already said to me that she opened the parcel herself and it 
wasn’t damaged in anyway. She was adamant that the item wasn’t there. So 
I challenged her- told her I was going to investigate it...She called back two 
days later and said she had found the camera…She has only just been a 
customer with us just under a year and she has already had £225 off us with 
a previous claim two months ago and she was trying to get £579 off us there 
… if they have been successful the first time around they try it again 
(Company 1)  
The workings of the specialist first party fraud team in Company 1 offer useful insight 
into how to improve first party fraud detection and mitigation methods. This company 
uses similar techniques to those used in the insurance industry, such as cognitive 
interviewing and voice-stress analysis. A dedicated team of customer service advisers 
were trained on these techniques in order to detect and mitigate customer fraud. Usually 
open questions are asked and investigators look at behavioural cues such as signs of 
nervousness, stammering and contradictory statements, to determine if the customer is 
lying. The retailer claimed that this approach helped it significantly reduce its losses 
from first party fraud.  
You find that the person who is dishonest is the one who becomes more 
aggressive and shouts loudest…sometimes you hear them stammer…and 
they argue with you, trying to throw you off… 
If they lie, they say one story in the first call and the next time it’s completely 
different, and I think then why did you say that the first time (Company 1) 
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However, we found that due to escalating caseloads, investigators prioritised cases for 
investigation usually based on a combination of experience/judgement, customers’ 
claims history and monetary value, which limited the retailer’s overall fraud 
performance.  
Some of the respondents also reported that internal collaboration between their fraud 
teams and other departments when fraud was suspected or proven was important in 
mitigating fraud losses: 
 “If we had any customer that has had a lot of claims on their account, we 
would inform our warehouse so that deliveries can be made with sufficient 
evidence…we can take pictures of the parcels before delivering and require 
signature on delivery…” (Company 1) 
“I had this customer who had several accounts with us and had made 
multiple claims on the accounts, the last claim was gold jewellery which she 
claimed she didn’t receive, about £5000. I got senior managers involved and 
the customer was visited. I recommended shutting the account because of 
the many high value claims as it was becoming uneconomical…” (Company 
1) 
However, we found that there were often no formal channels of communication 
between the fraud teams and sales/order and warehouse teams. Consequently, it was 
not unusual for orders to be accepted and delivered to individuals with high claims 
histories in such a manner that sufficient evidence was not gathered prior to dispatch, 
thereby exposing retailers to further abuse.   
This was often due to in part to the manner in which the fraud teams informed the sales 
teams and warehouse staff of suspicious accounts. This was usually done through 
internal correspondence or contact. 
Consequently, we believe there is potential for the use of rule-based detection 
algorithms or behavioural models to improve detection and mitigation capability and 
provide more benefit to retailers. In addition, better integration between teams, 
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especially the analysis, mitigation and investigation functions can provide statistical 
recommendations on case prioritisations. 
Investigation 
Investigation is a vital component of an anti-fraud strategy (Furlan and Bajec, 2008; 
Wilhelm, 2004). Retailers 1 & 2 confirmed that investigations were effective based on 
the outcomes, i.e. successful outcomes where customers owned up when confronted. 
However, potential savings made could not be confirmed. Company 1 cited instances 
where customer investigations have uncovered the possibility of fraud and the 
customers owned up to their fraudulent intent. 
We had this customer that was constantly claiming not to have received 
ordered items. A member of our field team visited the customer with the 
police and we found a stockpile of products in the customer’s home over 
£40,000 worth, some belonging to other retailers, and we notified these 
retailers (Company 2) 
We have had cases where customers apologised and said they didn’t realise 
that anyone would follow-up (Company 1) 
In these cases, the losses were mitigated. The way investigations were conducted varied 
between retailers. For example, in company 1, suspected fraudulent claims were dealt 
with using the experience of specially trained customer service advisers, who 
investigate and challenge customer claims. This approach places claims investigations 
with those at the front end - those closest to the customers - who were in a better position 
to assess and investigate the cases as efficiently as possible. These advisers received 
more specialist first party fraud training (compared to the rest of the customer service 
advisers) including the behavioural aspects of fraud. This approach was considered to 
yield positive results in some cases, as some customers would own up and admit that 
they received the parcels they were previously claiming not to have received. On the 
other hand, the fraud teams in Companies 2 & 3 carried out all fraud investigations 
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including first party fraud investigations. We found that first party fraud investigations 
were often the priority for these central fraud investigation teams.  
With investigations, the participating companies sought further information, either 
from the customer or building up clear evidence of intent. For companies 1 & 2 this 
involved having more senior loss-prevention managers visiting customers’ locations, 
sometimes accompanied by police, to query offenders (mostly serial offenders). As part 
of their investigations, all three retailers also monitored serial offenders’ order activity 
by picking and delivering their parcels in a manner that required capturing and 
maintaining evidence, for example, taking pictures of parcels prior to delivery and 
accompanying drivers during delivery. 
Analysis 
The importance of regular fraud risk assessment, monitoring and analytics in the 
management of fraud has been highlighted in the literature (Furlan and Bajec, 2008; 
Wilhelm, 2004; Gee, 2009). Fraud was generally monitored and reported to fraud 
managers or loss prevention managers at all three retailers we studied. However, of the 
three retailers only company 1 claimed to have an estimate of its first party fraud losses. 
In addition, whereas risk analysis was carried out at all three retailers following any 
major first party fraud incident, company 1 carried out detailed monthly first party fraud 
risk analysis overseen by a working group. This working group led by senior risk 
managers and including representatives from the main business units and support areas, 
meet on a monthly basis to assess their first party fraud losses including the value, root 
cause, prevention controls in place. This group also appraises the effect of their fraud 
strategy on their overall objective of reducing first party fraud losses and uses the 
insights gained from their fraud analysis to implement new policies or update existing 
ones. It emerged that the fraud strategy adopted by this retailer had resulted in 
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significant first party fraud loss reduction, up to 40% reduction, in a single financial 
year. 
We have a steering committee that meet monthly...we produce a monthly 
financial information pack of where our first party fraud claims have 
occurred and broken down by the cause, which carrier is responsible, which 
area of the business is being accountable for the claim. We will then use the 
information to focus on where we have our worst defences and challenge 
those areas of the business to carry out further investigation and report back. 
(Company 1) 
Every investigation we do has a case report, and every case report has a 
correction of errors. We carry out the corrections that mitigate the actions in 
the future. It’s about learning from our previous cases (Company 2) 
Fraud-risk identification and control also featured in the review process for new 
products and delivery channel for all three retailers. For example, for company 1, prior 
to the introduction of collection points in convenience stores, trials were done to make 
sure the channel did not introduce more frauds. All three retailers acknowledged the 
importance of good analytics in the prevention of all frauds. 
Policy 
Policy activities focus on the creation, evaluation and communication of fraud policies 
to reduce the incidence of fraud. Policy activities usually take advantage of the 
knowledge gained from the other framework activities, and are usually undertaken by 
very senior managers in an organisation (Wilhelm, 2004).  
We identified attempts by some of the retailers to mitigate first party fraud by revising 
some of their policies or even adopting new initiatives to minimise fraud losses. For 
example: 
We have customers now claiming to have received empty boxes on high 
value items such as iPads and electronic items. This is because we used to 
have situations where empty boxes were delivered to customers, usually on 
low value shoes due to thefts at our depots, but never on high value items. 
Some customers saw the glitch in our system, and now started claiming on 
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high value items like iPads…We used to just credit their accounts, but as 
this grew we had to step up security around those high value items 
(Company 1) 
…That’s why we now use DPD for those higher ticket items because the 
risks are a lot higher with the higher items (Company 2) 
Respondents indicated that following increasing losses from first party fraud, their 
companies would no longer accept returns without the tags or labels in place or if it 
showed any sign of use. Retailers also mentioned the adoption of new policy initiatives 
such as the use of collection points in convenience stores to improve customer 
experience and reduce fraudulent refund claims and adoption of end-to-end tracking of 
high value items to minimise refund fraud losses. 
Prosecution 
Prosecution is defined as the process of conducting legal proceedings against an 
offender for crime or breach of the law, with the aim of deterrence, restitution or 
recovery of losses (Wilhelm, 2004; NHS CFSMS, 2009). 
During the course of the research we found that prosecution was rarely pursued by any 
of the three participating retailers. Some of the respondents indicated that the external 
environment influenced their ability to undertake some activities in the fraud 
management lifecycle, particularly prosecution. Retailers reported experiencing mixed 
responses from the police when reporting fraud. The response received depended on a 
lot of factors such as the amount, the individual police force’s ability to investigate, 
police knowledge of the type of fraud (third party identity fraud was thought to be more 
familiar to the police and easier to prove than first party fraud) and whether the 
company could prepare the case or referral to the police in a way that was acceptable 
or police-friendly. At times, respondents expressed lack of confidence in the service 
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they received from the police especially with regards to first party fraud compared to 
other crimes like shoplifting: 
What we have found is that the police will always tend to say it needs to go 
to action fraud because it is fraud, but nothing happens (Company 2). 
I mean depending on the amount, the police are also reluctant to take on any 
case where we are trying to claim fraud anyway; they always want to refer 
us to action fraud… It’s a job for the police and not action fraud 
investigation. Sometimes you feel like you are hitting a brick wall dealing 
with the police (Company 1) 
Despite the largely negative reception from the police, there was also evidence from 
company 2 to suggest a good response from the police irrespective of the type or nature 
of the fraud. With such mixed responses, it is difficult to draw a conclusion. However, 
it can be deduced that the general impression from the police with regards to first party 
fraud varied from ‘uncooperative with a reluctance to take on first party fraud’ to ‘not 
interested in low-value fraud’.  
On the reasons why the police may be reticent to take on cases of first party fraud, 
respondents cited lack of police resources to deal with fraud issues, with majority of the 
respondents in the three companies expressing the need to build up evidence and carry 
out investigation themselves prior to reporting to the police.  
Retailers also did not pursue any civil litigation cases. When customers were found 
guilty of fraudulent activity, we found that financial considerations were used to 
determine the level of sanction imposed.  For the most part, the main punishment given 
to offenders was to reject the fraudulent claim or blocking serial offenders temporarily 
from making further purchases. Depending on the amount and the weight of evidence, 
prosecution could be sought (although rarely in practice). The present sanctions even 
though had some deterrent value were regarded by most respondents as insufficient to 
deter fraudulent behaviour.  
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When you challenge them, some of them will stop claiming for a while, they 
will open another account and start claiming again, mainly because there 
were no sanctions in the previous instance (Company 1) 
They don’t see any negative sides to that other than they can’t order with us 
again whereas if you did that in the store you could get put in a cell and you 
can get whatever repercussions from the police (Company 2) 
It is not effective from the point of actually stopping the behaviour, but by 
stopping the customer from transacting with us we are actually reducing our 
own losses (Company 3) 
Given the results, it can be said that the combined effect of police reluctance and to 
some extent retail reluctance to appropriately sanction their customers (Doig and Levi, 
2013; Fullerton and Punj, 2004; King et al., 2007) may be reinforcing these behaviours. 
A summary of the management strategies used across the three companies is reported 
in the table III below  
Table III.  Comparison of first party fraud management strategies  
Conclusion and Implications 
This research set out to investigate how retailers were currently managing the problem 
of first party fraud and how this could be improved. The fraud management lifecycle 
theory (Wilhelm, 2004) was used to analyse the data gathered from the collaborating 
companies. More broadly, this study provided insight into our understanding of the 
growing problem of first party fraud, existing management practices as well as 
presenting opportunities to build on.  
This research has shown that retailers are not effectively dealing with first party fraud 
owing to a number of factors including: poor understanding of first-party fraud, 
difficulty in detecting and proving first-party fraud compared to other frauds, poor 
response from the police, and ineffective sanctions. When first party fraud was 
suspected in some cases, retailers often found it very difficult to prove conclusively.  
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It is evidenced from the case studies that the competitive nature of the retail sector, with 
its focus on customer service, mostly inhibits effective first party fraud management. 
Retailers want to sell as many items as possible and increase their market share and this 
can sometimes get in the way of crime reduction.  
For the most part financial considerations were the main criteria in decisions about 
whether to manage first party fraud and which forms of the behaviour to prioritise over 
others. As one retailer rather critically noted when questioned why and whether they 
thought it useful to carry out risk scoring on their online orders considering that they 
were processing refunds in the six figure region on a weekly basis:  
It is about balancing risks and profit, but at the moment, it isn’t quite 
profitable to go down that route. There’s a lot of money involved, some 
customers check out multiple times, and this can be expensive (Company 2) 
This retailer had decided that it was not cost-effective to manage their refund fraud 
losses at this stage, as it was within their risk appetite, i.e. not yet in millions. This 
amount is enough to make any small or medium-sized retailer go out of business. 
The findings of the current study also raise important questions about how retailers are 
dealing with offending customers. The evidence appears to imply that retailers are 
largely reluctant to appropriately sanction offending customers. This, together with 
police reluctance in taking on first party fraud cases continues to ensure that customer 
fraud continues to be ingrained as a part of the culture of consumption. One retailer 
assumed that prosecuting their customers was going too far:  
I’m not being funny it’s not about how many people you send to prison or 
to court but it’s about recovering monies, so if they make a statement of 
admission we will put the value of the item back onto their account so that 
they owe us that money because they have the item and we will stop the 
account from purchasing from us until they have paid all the money or they 
get to a level where we might allow them to start buying again…you don’t 
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want to start losing money as well so it’s best if you try and recover the 
money and keep them as a customer (Company 1). 
This attitude towards first party fraud should be worrying as offenders can easily move 
up the fraud ladder. Retailers claimed that they have had difficulty with the police at 
some point when dealing with first party fraud cases; retailers face even bigger 
challenges in justifying police involvement with regards to first party fraud owing to 
the small amounts involved in this fraud. Two of the retailers noted that the police will 
always refer them to action fraud and nothing usually came out of it, one pointed out 
that the police had told them to deal with the issue as it was a commercial issue rather 
than a fraud issue, while another pointed out that depending on the amount the police 
will advise them to settle it themselves. Retailers warned that with the growth of e-
commerce, first party fraud was likely to become an even greater threat, which again 
emphasises the importance of law enforcement keeping pace with criminal activity in 
e-retail in terms of investigation and sanctioning of offenders. 
The findings of this study also suggest that there are many different opportunities for 
first party fraud in e-commerce. Indeed some of the findings demonstrate the ease of 
committing first party fraud, often requiring little or no sophistication. The fraud 
triangle is frequently used to identify the cause of crime and/or fraud (Cressey, 1973). 
Perceived opportunity is the result of circumstances that increases confidence in a 
perpetrator that they will evade detection and punishment when they commit crime. 
There are several factors that motivate people to commit fraud, mainly personal gain, 
past experience, revenge or negative attitude towards big businesses, cost-benefit 
consideration (perception that fraud provides more benefits than costs), peer pressure, 
etc. (Reynolds and Harris, 2005). Justification, the third component of the model, 
comprises a set of rationalisations employed be perpetrators to justify their behaviour.  
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Taken holistically, the findings of the study may suggest that a reluctance to 
appropriately punish offending customers coupled with the ease and availability of 
opportunities to commit first party fraud may intensify a perpetrators motivation to 
commit first party fraud.  
The motivation behind most crime including traditional retail and e-retail crime is the 
same. The immediate response is the deployment of better systems but so much more 
can be done to prevent the behaviour in the first place. We found that retailers placed a 
high priority on investigating and detecting fraud, and less on deterring and punishing 
offenders. The importance of reinforcing positive attitudes and arousing public 
consciousness on the issue of first party fraud has been largely overlooked. Customer 
awareness programs can be used to persuade consumers to “unlearn patterns of 
misconduct and to strengthen moral constraints that inhibit misbehaviour.” (Fullerton 
and Punj, 2004). With the growth of e-commerce and prevalence of this fraud, denial 
and assuming first party fraud as the cost of doing business is not a sound strategy, 
hence any applied research such as this one could be very useful for retailers. We 
believe that if retailers do not speak up about the problems they are facing and raise 
greater awareness, it may be difficult to garner enough public concern required to 
generate police interest in this issue.  
Overall, it was found that retailers used a range of measures and processes to deal with 
this problem. These measures ranged from prevention, detection and mitigation, 
analysis, investigation, and sanctions. With regards to prevention, the retailers used a 
number of tools and processes to reduce the opportunities for fraudulent behaviour, 
such as: credit checking new applications, working with delivery companies to improve 
delivery accuracy using technology, use of convenience stores as collection points, 
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intelligence sharing with other retailers among others. 
This research has shown that there are further steps retailers can take to effectively 
manage the problem of first party fraud. Even though all retailers agreed that they had 
zero tolerance for fraud, only company 1 appeared to have clear action plan to deal with 
the problem of first party fraud. This retailer also had good understanding of the nature 
and scale of most of their first party fraud losses. This action plan was born mostly 
when first-party fraud grew massively for this retailer, to the extent that it was a threat 
to their profitability. Further actions that retailers can undertake to manage first party 
fraud include increased staff fraud awareness training and pre-employment screening, 
wider intelligence sharing with retailers to reduce opportunities for fraud, measuring 
and monitoring first party fraud losses and putting in place adequate checks to guard 
against abuse of returns policies. Furthermore, we believe there is potential for the use 
of rule-based detection algorithms or behavioural models to improve detection and 
mitigation capability and provide more benefit to retailers.  
The findings of this study can also help other retailers (who have little or no knowledge 
of how to deal with this problem) effectively manage their own first party fraud losses. 
The workings of the specialist first party fraud team in Company 1 offer a useful insight 
into how to improve first party fraud detection methods. This company uses similar 
techniques to those used in the insurance industry, such as cognitive interviewing and 
voice-stress analysis.  
Just like any other research, this research has many limitations, which need further 
research: First, the research findings are only based on three retailers in the UK. As a 
result, the researchers understand that the findings may not be representative of the 
whole retail domain and therefore need further investigation using empirical method 
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and targeting a much wider audience. However, the relevance of the findings should 
not be overlooked- being the first study to address this practical retail problem. Second, 
this study is also limited by the use of the case study method, the limited number of 
interviews used, non-availability of available literature and data from the companies 
due to confidentiality issues. Therefore, future research is encouraged using 
quantitative methods to test the validity of the findings across the entire retail sector.  
It will be useful to find out the impact of customer awareness on changing attitudes 
towards this behaviour. An experiment may be carried out to test the effect of increased 
awareness on different samples. This may provide the needed push for retailers to 
consider this strategy. It will also be interesting to carry out detailed research into the 
reasons why consumers engage in these behaviour; targeting consumers themselves. 
Knowing why consumers engage in these behaviours may provide clues as to what 
interventions are likely to be successful. The researchers acknowledge that these are 
not the only dysfunctional behaviours committed against retailers, for e.g. shoplifting, 
etc. However, these were excluded in line with the focus of the study, the urgency of 
the matter (most retailers have reported not knowing how to deal with these frauds), as 
well as the space and time limitations of the study, hence might be considered a 
limitation of the current study. We suggest extending this research by conducting more 
case studies in other countries to learn about good practices elsewhere. An industry 
wide survey of practices used by other companies will also be useful in generalising the 
results of this study. 
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Table I.  Description of respondents at Company 1, 2 and 3 
Case Study Companies Departments 24 Interviewees 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fraud Risk/Security 
 
Logistics 
 
Fraud Investigation 
 
Contact Centre 
Manager (3) 
 
Manager (1) 
 
Manager (1), Investigator (1) 
 
Contact Centre staff (First level 
investigators) (7) 
2 
 
 
Loss Prevention 
 
Logistics 
Manager (3) 
Analysts (3) 
 
Manager (1) 
3 Central investigation Investigators (4) 
 
Table II.  Comparison of first party fraud types across the three retailers (Y= present, N=absent) 
Type of first party 
fraud 
Case company 1 Case company 2 Case company 3 
Deshopping Y Y N 
Refund fraud Y Y Y 
Fraudulent 
chargebacks 
N Y Y 
Misuse of facility 
fraud 
Y N N 
Coupon fraud N Y N 
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Table III.  Comparison of first party fraud management strategies  
Approach Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
Deterrence No specific program aimed at 
deterrence. Deterrence seen as 
resulting from sanctions. 
No specific program 
aimed at deterrence. 
Deterrence seen as 
resulting from 
sanctions. 
No specific program 
aimed at deterrence. 
Deterrence seen as 
resulting from 
sanctions. 
Prevention -Fraud-proofing new concepts and 
systems to reduce fraud 
-Training staff to help prevent fraud 
-Staff surveillance, use of 
surveillance cameras in 
depots/warehouses 
-In-house automated transaction risk 
scoring of all orders, including use 
of 3-d secure authentication 
-Use of credit referencing agency for 
credit applications 
-Have measured their losses to first 
party fraud  
-External collaboration with few 
other retailers (manually) 
-Fraud-proofing new 
concepts and systems 
to reduce fraud 
-Training staff to help 
prevent fraud 
-Staff surveillance, use 
of surveillance cameras 
in depots/warehouses 
-In-house automated 
transaction risk scoring 
of only general 
merchandise orders, 
including use of 3-d 
secure authentication 
-External collaboration 
with few other retailers 
(manually) 
-Training staff to 
help prevent fraud 
-Staff surveillance 
-Automated 
transaction risk 
scoring of all orders 
(outsourced), 
including use of 3-d 
secure authentication 
-External 
collaboration with 
few other retailers 
(manually) 
-Pre-employment 
checks carried out on 
all staff 
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Detection  
 
-Technology (database) used to 
monitor customers’ claims histories 
- The detection of first party fraud 
was mostly not automated, relying 
on retail staff to detect and mitigate 
fraud losses 
-Deshopping usually detected by 
warehouse staff by visually 
inspecting or smelling returned 
merchandise 
- Specialist first party fraud analysts 
who work within the contact centre 
often dealt with fraudulent claims. A 
combination of customers’ past 
experience and behavioural cues 
were used to detect and mitigate 
fraudulent customer claims 
-Suspected cases are investigated by 
trained staff 
- The detection of first 
party fraud was mostly 
not automated, relying 
on retail staff to detect 
and mitigate fraud 
losses 
-Past behaviour used to 
predict fraudulent 
intent 
-Technology 
(database) used to 
collect data on 
customer returns which 
assisted generalist 
fraud teams in the 
detection and 
mitigation of 
fraudulent customer 
claims 
-Suspected cases are 
investigated by trained 
staff 
- The detection of 
first party fraud was 
mostly not 
automated, relying 
on retail staff to 
detect and mitigate 
fraud losses 
-Past behaviour used 
to predict fraudulent 
intent 
-Technology used to 
collect data to assist 
in detection 
-Detection carried 
out mainly by 
generalist fraud team 
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Mitigation Detection and Mitigation of 
deshopping usually carried out by 
warehouse staff who visually inspect 
and reject returned items where 
fraudulent activity was suspected 
- Specialist first party fraud analysts 
who work within the contact centre 
often dealt with fraudulent claims. A 
combination of customers’ past 
experience and behavioural cues 
were used to detect and mitigate 
fraudulent customer claims 
Internal communication and 
collaboration between the fraud team 
and other departments in managing 
first party fraud losses, e.g. 
suspending suspicious accounts or 
stepping up security when packing 
and delivering items from suspicious 
accounts  
 
Detection and 
Mitigation of 
deshopping usually 
carried out by 
warehouse staff who 
visually inspect and 
reject returned items 
where fraudulent 
activity was suspected 
Fraudulent customer 
claims handled by 
generalist fraud team 
whose major remit was 
on managing third 
party fraudulent cases 
Mitigation of 
deshopping usually 
carried out by 
warehouse staff who 
visually inspect and 
reject returned items 
where fraudulent 
activity was 
suspected 
Fraudulent customer 
claims handled by 
generalist fraud team 
whose major remit 
was on managing 
third party fraudulent 
cases 
Investigation -Referrals are logged and individual 
investigator performance is assessed 
(number of referrals investigated) 
-First party fraud cases were usually 
investigated by specialist contact 
centre trace advisers 
-Senior loss prevention managers 
were sometimes accompanied by 
-Investigations were 
mainly carried out by 
more generalist fraud 
and loss prevention 
team 
-Senior loss prevention 
managers were 
sometimes 
accompanied by police 
-Investigations 
conducted by the 
fraud team but no 
house visits carried 
out  
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police to customers’ homes to 
interrogate serial offenders 
to customers’ homes to 
interrogate serial 
offenders 
Analysis -Effective arrangements in place for 
collating and analyzing first party 
fraud losses  
-Dedicated working group led by 
senior risk managers and including 
representatives from the main 
business units and support areas 
meet monthly. 
-Detailed assessment of first party 
fraud losses as well as gap analysis 
of controls in place are discussed 
- Detailed analysis of successful first 
party fraud cases are used to update 
existing policies 
-Detailed analysis of 
large-scale first party 
fraud losses are carried 
out and corrective 
actions put in place  
 
-Analysis of 
successful first party 
fraud cases  
- Detailed analysis of 
successful first party 
fraud cases are used 
to update existing 
policies 
Prosecution -Prosecution was rarely pursued  
with respect with first party fraud 
- Retailer also rarely pursued any 
civil litigation cases. Fraudulent 
claims are rejected and offending 
customers asked to pay what they 
owe. In extreme cases, usually where 
there was evidence of re-offending 
customers could be temporarily 
suspended; prosecution rarely if ever 
sought 
-Retailer’s policy is to 
block serial offenders 
from purchasing with 
the retailer; 
prosecution was rarely 
sought 
-Prosecution depended 
on the weight of 
evidence, associated 
amount of loss, and 
police willingness to 
accept case but this 
- Retailer’s policy is 
to block serial 
offenders from 
purchasing with the 
retailer; 
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-The level of sanction applied 
depended on the amount of loss and 
frequency of behaviour  
was rarely, if ever, 
pursued. 
 
 
